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ABSTRACT: In this contribution I outline some ideas on 
what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer 
us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role 
that imagery plays for social action and cognition. 
Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would 
allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of 
embodied cognition rather than in representational 
terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, 
and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the 
anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct Dewey’s 
notion of imaginative rehearsal in light of contemporary, 
competing models of intersubjectivity such as embodied 
simulation theory and the narrative practice hypothesis, 
and argue that the Deweyan model offers us a more 
encompassing framework which can be useful for 
reconciling these approaches. In this text I am mainly 
concerned with sketching a broad picture of the lines 
along which such a project could be developed. For this 
reason not all questions are given equal attention, and I 
shall concentrate mainly on the basic ideas, without 
going directly into the details of many of them. 
 
 
1. Habit and interaction  
 
In the pragmatist model interaction is assumed to be 
constitutive of the mode of being of social phenomena 
(Dewey 1984, 240; 1981, 153). The primacy of the notion 
of ‘action’ leads here to a habit ontology insofar as the 
process where actions are cast into patterns is 
understood as a matter of habit formation, in which 
standing patterns of action are formed (see Testa 2017). 
Such a process is built into the organic nature of 
embodied living beings and is sensitive to the 
affordances of the natural and social environment 
(Dewey 1983, 38). Hence, habitual patterns are both 
embodied in individual organisms, and also embedded in 
the environment which such organisms interact with.  
Habitual patterns of behaviour, understood as 
fundamental explanans and ontological constituents of 
social reality, are not understood by pragmatism as 
internal, individual, and representational units, but are 
rather conceived of in externalist terms (Steiner 2013). 
This does not exclude that internal mechanisms occur, 
but these are rather not to be modelled at their 
fundamental level on representational processes, and 
are to be conceived as ontologically derived from the 
sensorimotor character of embodied processes. This 
allows for an interactive and sensorimotor approach to 
cognition, based on the idea that “interaction” is the 
“basic category” and the “primary fact” (Dewey 1982, 
129). Due to the “motor urgent force of habit” (Dewey 
1983, 39), experience is for Dewey a vital, practical, and 
emotional matter of upward sensorimotor organization, 
and “cognition” has to be understood as a “derived 
phenomenon”, secondary in its “origin”. 
At first sight it might appear strange that a model of 
social interaction based on a habit ontology may allow 
us to give a central role to imagery in the articulation of 
our experience. Still this is exactly the case if we consider 
that what connects habit with imagery is its “motor 
urgent force” (Dewey 1984, 39). Habits operate in fact as 
an anticipatory mechanism of possible action, insofar as 
they are based on past experiences of acting in certain 
circumstances which have given rise to patterns of 
actions of a certain form and structure (see Mättänen 
2010). In this sense stabilized action patterns allow us to 
distance ourselves from what is immediately present and 
to see the actuality in light of possibilities of action (see 
Alexander 1993, 384; Dorstewitz 2008; 2016).  
 
2. Imagery as Anticipation of Action 
 
If we now consider the way habits operate as an 
anticipated future, we can begin to better appreciate 
first why habits can manifest a purposive structure, 
referred to action goals, even when they are not yet 
associated with intentional and conscious behaviour. 
Habitual patterns can implement what Dewey named 
‘ends-in-view’, that is, ends through which a particular 
consequence is foreseen, already at a pre-linguistic and 
pre-reflective subpersonal level, that is, in the form of 
habitual mechanisms or automatisms. And this 
purposive structure is closely connected with the role of 
imagery.  
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Imagination has traditionally been understood as a 
reproduction in absentia, that is, as forming a 
representation of something that is not actually present. 
But if viewed through the lens of habit formation, 
imagery has a motor character rather than a 
representational nature, since it consists of a mechanism 
of the anticipation of action implemented by neural, 
functional and phenomenological structures controlling 
overt action
1
. Once we realize that habits are basically 
anticipatory mechanisms, we can begin to see that they 
are instances of consummation (Dewey 1989, chap. 3), 
that is, that they intrinsically involve a form of standing 
readjustment to experience, of more or less creative 
rearrangement of our action patterns. And in this sense 
the appreciation of the intrinsic role that imaginative 
reproduction plays within the pragmatist conception 
may contribute to the overcoming of the identification 
of habits with dead, fixed routines, which has been 
prevalent in the recent tradition of both philosophy and 
cognitive sciences (for a critical survey of this 
identification in different areas of philosophical thought 
and empirical research, see Camdic 1986; Kilpinen 2012; 
Seger and Spiering 2011; Barandian and Di Paolo 2014; 
Bernacer and Murillo 2014). The formation, the 
maintenance, and the transformation of habits, as well 
as the reconstruction of frustrated action patterns, all 
require that some degree of imaginative anticipation and 
rearrangement of experience be at play. 
The motor character of imagery is also underlined by 
Dewey when he analyses the notion of ‘imagination’ in 
itself. For instance, in his 1896 essay on “Imagination 
and Expression”, “motor imagery” is the crucial notion 
Dewey develops in order to understand what 
                                                 
1
 Counterfactual reasoning is in this sense not a matter 
of possible worlds, but rather a matter of imaginary 
variations of the conditions of experience controlled by 
abductive patterns and which plays a constitutive role 
for our everyday perception and thinking. Whereas the 
logical formula of induction for Peirce “expresses the 
physiological process of formation of habit” (Peirce 
1931-58, 2. 643), the formula of abduction expresses the 
forward looking dimension of habit and its constitutive 
role for experience. 
imagination is. In this sense he writes that “imagery of all 
kinds has a tendency to overflow in the motor channels”, 
“a tendency to reproduce through action and 
experience” (Dewey 1972, 194). In this light Dewey, 
while for instance analysing the activity of drawing, 
sharply criticizes the representational model of imagery 
which opposes the representational content – the idea, 
the material to be conveyed – and the mode of 
expression – the mode of conveyance, the bodily format 
of the natural physical and psychical process of 
expression. The “motor expression” is assumed by 
Dewey to be not just a contextual or enabling condition, 
but rather a constitutive element of the representational 
content, of the idea to be expressed
2
. And it is in this 
context that Dewey writes that “thought is thought only 
in and through action” (Dewey 1972, 195). In this sense, 
Dewey locates his account of imagery within the context 
of the motor control of action rather than that of 
representational visual cognition, and it is in this sense 
that he anticipates contemporary embodied and 
enactive approaches to imagery, which understand 
imagery as a form of action rather than as a form of 
representational inscription (for the latter, see for 
instance Thomas 1999; 2014; Bartolomeo et. al. 2013). 
One can easily see that the appreciation of the 
sensorimotor and expressive character of imagery does 
not reify it as a separate cognitive faculty – as if 
sensation, imagination and thought were self-standing 
cognitive processes – but rather understands it as a 
moment, a function which is more or less manifest in 
every instance of experience. Moreover, Dewey also 
underlines the role that habituation plays in the working 
of imagery when he writes that “the so-called 
mechanical phase is necessary to the integrity of the 
spiritual” (1972, 195). Even the imaginative function is a 
form of more or less plastic stability, a motor cognitive 
                                                 
2
 See Dewey 1972, 195: “We cannot speak of an idea and 
its expression; the expression is more than a mode of 
conveying an already formed idea; it is part and parcel of 
its formation.” See also ibid: “thought is thought only in 
and through action”. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  8,  I ssu e 1 ,  2017 
TH E  I M A G I N A T I V E  RE H E A R S A L  M O D E L   
–  DE W E Y ,  E M B O D I E D  S I M U L A T I O N ,  A N D  T H E  NA R R A T I V E  HY P O T H E S I S  
I t a l o  T e s t a  
 
 
 106
disposition, and the sort of habitual patterns we embody 
influences the grain of the sort of imagination we can 
develop. If we now remind ourselves of the interactive 
and embedded structure of habitual embodiment, we 
can realize that imagination in this general sense is not 
just a cephalocentric and internal representational 
activity but is itself fundamentally shaped and 
constrained by the bodily format and the externalist 
social structure of habit formation. 
In the pragmatist, Deweyan model, experience as a 
whole can be understood (to different degrees) as a 
process of “embodied imaginative transition” (for this 
expression see Cuffari 2011, 539). If this holds, then I think 
that the tendency of some interpreters to think that 
Dewey “restricts imagination to conscious experience” 
(Fesmire 2003, 83), and accordingly to identify imagery 
with reflective imaginative rehearsal, should be criticized. 
When Dewey writes that “all conscious experience has of 
necessity some degree of imaginative quality” (Dewey 
2008, 276), he is not at all excluding that some degree of 
imaginative quality can be proper to unconscious 
experience. On the contrary, the idea that habits act as an 
anticipation of the future means that they are imbued 
with imagery. And since in the pragmatist understanding 
of habits there is a continuous transition from subpersonal 
and personal, pre-reflective and reflective, unconscious 
and conscious activity, the same holds for the forms of 
imaginative reproduction they are infused with. 
Imaginative reproduction, then, should not be restricted 
to only conscious forms: the pragmatist model allows 
rather for the idea that imagery takes place already at the 
subpersonal and unconscious level
3
. Of course this does 
                                                 
3
 Some may hold, as a referee points out, that imagery 
or imagination is a process that by definition needs to be 
consciously realized. But even in the more 
commonsensical use, where imagination is understood 
as representation in absentia, I do not need to be aware 
of the fact that I have imagined something to be the case 
in order for me to have imagined that. I might discover it 
retrospectively, but this might never happen. If we now 
come to our more specific use of the notion of imagery 
as involved in the anticipation of action, one can see that 
this need not be a process I am aware of while it is 
not mean that everything that happens at the subpersonal 
and unconscious level possesses an imaginative quality. 
But the motor character which characterizes both habit 
and imagery means that at least motor acts which are 
connected with reciprocal interaction cannot be 
understood without referring to the role that imagery 
plays within them. 
The overall form of imagery as a quality of habitual 
experience is that of a mechanism of anticipation of 
action. In order to understand the interactive structure of 
imagery, it is important to note that imagery as 
anticipation of action has two main aspects. On the one 
hand imagination involves a form of i) sympathy or 
empathy, understood by Dewey in his Ethics as “entering 
by imagination into the situation of the other” (Dewey 
1978, 150). Hence the anticipatory structure of habit is 
defined in its intersubjective form exactly by the role of 
imagery: habitual anticipatory imagery is the mechanism 
that sustains that capacity to put oneself in the place of 
the other that for both Dewey and Mead is constitutive of 
sociality (see Mead 1967, 325). Secondly, as we have seen, 
imagery as anticipation of action is ii) a mechanism of 
tapping a situation’s possibilities (Fesmire 2003, 65). But it 
is important here to realize that this tapping for 
possibilities of action does not only occur when we 
reflectively consider alternative possibilities, as is the case 
for instance with moral deliberation. In fact some degree 
of imagery is always present in action, and even when we 
act out of automatism, we unconsciously imaginatively 
anticipate counterfactual possibilities of action.  
 
                                                                       
happening, since the mechanism of anticipation is 
needed not only at the level of deliberative processes 
where I reflectively consider different courses of action, 
but also at the level of sensorimotor tasks connected 
with our pre-reflective perceptual engagement with the 
world. Moreover, the idea of unconscious imagery has 
an important tradition in philosophical thought also 
outside the pragmatist tradition. For instance, Kant’s 
transcendental or productive imagination is understood 
as an activity which operates by definition at an 
unconscious level. Kendall Walton distinguishes between 
spontaneous and deliberative imagining, where the first 
occurs without the subject’s conscious direction (1990). 
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3. Two forms of Imaginative Rehearsal 
 
For the above mentioned reasons I think we can be more 
faithful to the pragmatist model if we say that this allows 
us to make an analytical distinction between a) 
imaginative anticipation as operative in overt action, and 
b) imaginative anticipation as operative in vicarious 
action. In a sense these are both manifestations of some 
sort of imaginative rehearsal, since they both involve 
some sort of capacity of entering into the situation of 
the other, and some sort of tapping for possibilities of 
action. The notion of dramatic rehearsal is here a good 
metaphor which captures the sensorimotor character of 
imagery in action, i.e. the fact that this process involves 
a form of enactment and embodiment of the motor 
possibilities which are anticipated through the vehicle of 
habits. The notion of dramatic rehearsal is also a good 
metaphor for expressing the interpersonal structure of 
imagery, the fact that anticipation of action always 
happens in a context where we are performing with 
others into whose situation we need to enter. 
If we now consider the analytical distinction of the 
two forms of imagery I have introduced, one can see 
that only the second one, that is imaginative anticipation 
as operative in vicarious action, is what Dewey 
understood as the form of imaginative rehearsal that is 
proper to moral deliberation. I will label this as 
‘reflective imaginative rehearsal’ in order to distinguish it 
from the other form we have analysed and to which the 
structure of dramatic imaginative rehearsal can also be 
attributed as happening at a pre-reflective level. 
Deliberation as reflective imaginative rehearsal is 
characterized by Dewey as a case where imaginative 
anticipation, instead of being operative in overt action, 
results rather in a form of a “vicarious” way of acting 
(Dewey 2008, 200), where overt, “direct action” is 
temporarily inhibited and delayed. Reflective 
imaginative rehearsal still has a motor character, only 
that here action is diverted, “activity is turned from 
execution into intra-organic channels” (Dewey 1983, 
133). And it is important to remind ourselves that the 
blocking of overt action that occurs here is directly 
related to the process of habit formation, and namely, to 
a situation where prior habits enter into conflict with 
new impulses to action and are somehow impeded to 
manifest in direct action.  
 Reflection is thus understood as some sort of 
introverted, off-line, indirect activity. As Dewey writes 
“this very inhibition gives habit a chance at 
manifestation in thought”, “projecting itself into the 
screen of imagination” (Dewey 1983, 133). Reflective 
deliberation is thus understood as a case where “habit 
traverses its imaginary path” (1983, 134), that is, 
manifests itself as reflected habit: as a habit that, while 
entering into conflict with other habits and being 
suspended in its urgent and automatic motor character, 
becomes conscious. And the choice which eventually 
concludes the deliberative process is thus understood as 
the moment where the impeded energy is released and 
some combination of habit “finds a way fully open” to 
overt, on-line, direct action. 
 
4. Simulation Theory, Narrative Hypothesis,  
and the Imaginative Rehearsal Model 
 
One could be tempted here to read Dewey’s dramatic 
rehearsal as being close to some sort of simulation 
theory
4
. Imaginative rehearsal would then result in an as 
if experience, where alternative courses of conduct are 
internally simulated by being projected on the 
imaginative screen. Instead of being overtly performed, 
the inhibited action would be screened in a mental trial, 
which would consist of a vicarious, anticipatory way of 
acting, a sort of efference copy of the direct action (see 
for instance Grush 2004). But one has to note here that, 
even though Dewey sometimes uses some sort of 
internalist representational lexicon in order to 
                                                 
4
 For a contemporary interpretation of basic imagining 
on the basis of a simulation theory, see for instance 
Currie and Ravenscroft (2013), who interpret imaging as 
perceptual reenactment. 
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characterize dramatic rehearsal – as for instance when 
he speaks of the screen of imagination – on the other 
hand the very idea of dramatic rehearsal also underlines 
the deeply embodied and enactive aspect of imagery. 
Moreover, reflective imaginative rehearsal is an aspect 
of conscious deliberation and its structure should not be 
attributed to imagination as a whole. Reflective 
imaginative rehearsal is rather an exercise of imagery 
that we develop at a later stage in life and against the 
background of ongoing forms of pre-reflective 
imaginative anticipation. Deliberation as reflective 
imaginative rehearsal is then some sort of specialized 
occurrence of imagery that intervenes when habitual 
automatic patterns become frustrated and need to be 
reconstructed. For this reason, even if we were to think 
that deliberation involves some form of internal 
simulation, this would not mean that simulation should 
be understood as the general model for the operation of 
interactional imagery, but could rather be understood as 
a specialized embodied routine which intervenes in 
some specific cases where habitual patterns are 
disrupted and default embodied imagery in action is 
suspended. 
When Dewey writes that deliberation is “dramatic 
and active rather than mathematic and impersonal” 
(1978, 293), he is clearly stating that, to his mind, the 
process by which in deliberation we reflectively consider 
various courses of action, should not be modelled as a 
case of rational calculation. While opposing this 
utilitarianist understanding of deliberation, Dewey also 
underlines the interpersonal structure of intrapersonal 
deliberation, that is the fact that individual agents that 
reflect on their conduct anticipate within themselves the 
point of view of other agents. Even when this takes the 
form of an intrapersonal monological activity, the latter 
is nevertheless shaped by and responsive to social 
external interpersonal constraints. Moreover, the 
qualification of imagery as dramatic rehearsal, with its 
concern with characters, plot and scenarios (Caspary 
2000, 113-115) underlines also the story-structured and 
narrative form of imagination that we need in order to 
enter into the situation of others and to interpret their 
actions as motivated by reasons. It is not by chance that 
Dewey in his early essay “Imagination and Expression” 
sees what he’ll later label as imaginative rehearsal as 
already present in the pretend play of the child (“he acts 
an idea out before he really takes it in”, Dewey 1978, 
197). Even according to Mead the genetic role that 
pretend play occupies as for the emergence of the 
capacity of role taking seems to involve a model which is 
coalescent with that of imaginative rehearsal (see The 
Social Self, Mead 1913, on the “dramatic” aspect of the 
self as a “character”, and also on the dramatic character 
of reflective moral reflection). 
 Reflective imaginative rehearsal can thus be 
understood as an extension, and sometimes an 
introversion – but remember that deliberation is not 
intrinsically monological and can also be pursued as a 
conjoint interpersonal action – of the form of 
imaginative rehearsal which is already operative at a 
pre-reflective and pre-intentional level. Here the model 
of imaginative rehearsal can be seen as a pragmatist 
precursor of the narrative practice hypothesis. The latter 
has been proposed (Hutto and Gallagher 2008) as an 
alternative to theory-theory and simulation theory 
explanations of folk psychology. According to the 
narrative hypothesis, our capacity to understand others, 
and in particular to understand reasons for action would 
not require us to be endowed from scratch with an 
intentionalist theory of mind nor that we operate some 
simulative procedure. According to the narrative practice 
hypothesis, we normally achieve our folk-psychological 
understanding of others by engaging from childhood in 
story-telling practices.  
It is important to note that narrative practice does 
not stand alone. On this account our capacity to 
understand others would consist in an extension of 
those mechanisms of protological perceptually based 
recreative imaging that already belonged to our hominid 
forerunners (Hutto 2008, 79), and of those early forms 
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embodied pretend play that require children to occupy 
characters and personas that are different to their own, 
and that are implemented by the exposure of the 
children to their parents’ story-telling. As one can see, 
the narrative practice hypothesis, in order to be put in 
motion, presupposes a sort of imaginative activity to be 
already operative. And I think that here the notion of 
imaginative rehearsal offered by pragmatism – 
understood as traversing a continuum from prereflective 
and reflective imaginative rehearsal – can be read as 
some sort of more encompassing model, which 
somehow bridges the gap between embodied simulation 
theories (Gallese 2005; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011) and 
the narrative hypothesis.  
In embodied simulation theory mechanisms of 
embodied simulation are supposed to already be 
operative at a subpersonal, functional, and physiological 
level – whereas the notion of narrative practice is a 
personal level, phenomenological concept. Supporters of 
the narrative practice have argued (against embodied 
simulation) that the notion of simulation is itself a 
personal level concept (Gallagher 2007) and cannot be 
properly applied at the subpersonal level of the mirror 
system; whereas supporters of embodied simulation 
have argued that the narrative hypothesis confines 
action’s understanding at the level of high level linguistic 
practice and does not account for lower levels of action’s 
understanding and for their subpersonal, functional and 
neural underpinnings (Sinigaglia 2009). Here the 
pragmatist model is an interesting one, since imagery, 
when understood as a habitual, embodied process, is a 
notion that is likely to be applied both at the 
subpersonal and at the personal, at the implicit and at 
the explicit level – and hence is less exposed than the 
notion of simulation to the criticism of being applicable 
only at the personal level. Moreover, the notion of 
imagery is more encompassing than the high-ranging 
notion of narrative practice, since it encompasses not 
only high level, linguistic competences, but it also 
includes lower level, subpersonal mechanisms such as 
those involved in embodied simulation theory. Finally, 
the pragmatist notion of motor imagery offers an 
approach to basic imagining which can account in a non-
representational way for the embodied intersubjective 
mechanism of the anticipation of action implemented by 
the mirror system, while being compatible with the 
enactivist approach to imagining supported by the 
narrative practice hypothesis
5
. Hence embodied 
imaginative rehearsal could be the basis for a unitary 
paradigm which accounts in a continuous way for our 
habit based ways of understanding others in action. 
 
5. Imagery and Decision Making 
 
Let me finally observe that the analytic distinction I have 
broached between pre-reflective imagery in action and 
reflective imagery as postponed action, can be seen as 
manifesting (under the aspect of the imaginative 
function) the dual character of interaction – as being 
both active and passive, spontaneous and receptive, 
unconscious and conscious. If we do not reify this dual 
phenomenon but understand it as a perspectival and 
relative manifestation of the continuum of action 
anticipation in experience, then we are in a position to 
see that the overcoming of the strong dualism between 
routine and intelligent action also involves a re-
evaluation of the role that imagery plays at every stage 
of the decision making process. And this can be better 
appreciated if we realize that even recent literature is 
increasingly re-evaluating the role that habitual 
behaviour plays at different levels of decision making
6
. 
                                                 
5
As Hutto acknowledges (2015), cognitive activities such 
as imagination, where what is thought about is not 
present or non-existent, may pose a threat to the 
enactivist non-representational approach to cognition, 
at least if one assumes that thinking about what is 
absent is merely a contentful mental representation of 
that thing. What the pragmatist perspective offers here 
is, as I have argued, an account of this imaging in 
absence which is not modeled on representations, but 
rather on the motor character of basic imagery. 
6
 See for instance Wagner & Northoff (2014), who in a 
recent article based on empirical research in psychology 
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But how does this impact on the role that imagery plays 
within such a process? 
Let’s take for instance Selten’s criticism of game 
theory through his bounded rational decision making 
model (1978). Selten distinguishes three hierarchical 
levels of decision making, that is, routine, imagination, 
and reasoning. The three levels involve a stepwise 
increase in cognitive effort: individuals first use 
procedures that incur low cognitive cost, and move on to 
more costly procedures only if there is no simpler 
solution (Sarieh 2010). At the level of routine decisions, 
these are based on past experiences with similar 
situations and are made without any conscious effort. At 
the level of imagination, outcomes of new scenarios are 
imagined by using the routine knowledge to make 
guesses. At the level of reasoning the decision maker 
makes conscious use of present and past information 
and uses logical reasoning to draw a conclusion (and this 
is the only level of decision making admitted and 
permitted by standard game theory). According to 
Selten, for every given situation decision, there is a pre-
decision, where the decision maker first uses a routine 
level decision process in order to choose which level of 
decision making to employ, and a final decision, that is a 
metadecision – itself made on the routine level – where 
the suggested choices are selected. The distinction 
between pre-decision and final decision accounts here 
for the fact that people can always reach a routine 
decision, but not always follow the solution offered by 
the higher rational level even if they know it to be the 
best one. Hence, contrary to the rational agent theory, in 
bounded rationality the agent does not always choose to 
perform the action with the optimal expected outcome. 
One can see that on the one hand the hierarchical 
structure of such a model presupposes a dualism 
                                                                       
and the neurosciences, conclude that the role of habits 
cuts cross the decision making process, since “habits can 
be considered to reflect not only a balance between 
internally and externally guided decision-making, but 
also a balance between diachronic and synchronic 
timescales that are involved in the relevant decision-
making processes”. 
between habit understood as routine (lower level), and 
goal oriented rational action (upper level), which are put 
on the two extremes of the scale. And routine is here 
understood to be a lower level than imagination on the 
assumption that it would not allow the person to put 
themself in the other person’s shoes. On the other hand, 
the fact that pre-decisions and final decisions are taken 
at the routine level – which involves no conscious 
deliberation – somehow gives an encompassing role to 
habitual processes. But in Selten the fact that pre-
decision is set at the level of routine is a sort of ad hoc 
assumption and there is no theoretical justification for 
this, if not for the fact that in this way Selten’s model 
avoids the risk, faced by many rational choice models, of 
introducing too high a degree of complexity and 
cognitive costs.  
As we have seen, in Selten’s model imagination is 
put in the middle as a third term between routine and 
rationality. Now, Selten’s model lets us appreciate that 
habits are involved in decision making. One could say 
that, from a pragmatist perspective, it is exactly this 
habit based character of decision making which 
constitutes the bounded character of rationality. On the 
other hand, it seems that in order to give a 
comprehensive account of this fact, one needs to rethink 
even the higher degrees of decision making – 
imagination and rationality – as themselves being habit 
based. Here pragmatist habit ontology could offer us a 
model that overcomes the dualism between habitual 
and intelligent action. Moreover, Dewey’s take on 
imagination as motor imagery understands imagery not 
as a separate cognitive faculty, but rather as a function 
and a qualitative aspect which permeates both routine 
and reflective reasoning understood as manifestations of 
different degrees of habitual mindedness. If motor 
imagery is in this aspect a mechanism of anticipation of 
possibilities of action, then the two forms of imaginative 
rehearsal I have analytically distinguished, that is 
imagery in action and imagery as vicarious action, are 
both to be considered as involved in and constitutive of 
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the whole process of decision making and not just of its 
intermediate level. And decision making, being 
intertwined at all its levels with habitual patterns and 
bounded by them, will then be a process that happens at 
both unconscious and conscious, pre-reflective and 
reflective levels. 
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